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Why the Rule-of-Law Dictates That the
Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in Full
Force to Immigration Proceedings
LINDSAY MACDONALD*
This article discusses how and why the exclusionary rule should
apply in the immigration context. The first part of the article sets out
the history of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings, start-
ing prior to the Lopez-Mendoza decision, moving to the decision
itself, and then discussing how the lower courts have interpreted the
decision. Next, the article examines how the cost-benefit analysis that
the Supreme Court used in Lopez-Mendoza to determine that the
exclusionary rule need not apply in removal hearings would come out
much differently if the Court weighed those same factors today. The
article then considers how the increased involvement of state and
local law enforcement in the enforcement of immigration law has
brought about even more changes to the immigration law landscape.
The article concludes with the argument that the cost-benefit analysis
should be abandoned when trying to determine whether the exclu-
sionary rule should apply in immigration proceedings, and, instead,
the exclusionary rule should apply in full force to immigration pro-
ceedings based on the application of the rule-of-law principles that
the exclusionary rule was originally designed to protect.
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I. INTRODUCTION
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,1 the case that sets out the parameters for
application of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings, was
decided in 1984—three decades ago. The Supreme Court’s opinion in
this case was the last time that the highest court in the nation weighed in
on this subject.2 To say that the immigration landscape has changed over
the past thirty years is an understatement. The increase in the immigrant
population alone paints a vivid picture. The unauthorized immigrant
population has quadrupled since 19903 while the total number of legal
immigrants has nearly doubled since the 1980s.4 Both the number of
annual removal proceedings5 and immigration-related criminal prosecu-
tions have increased significantly since 1984.6
1. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
2. See Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations
in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008
WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2010) (“The Lopez-Mendoza holding has shaped immigration procedure
for over two decades . . . .”); see also Irene Scharf, The Exclusionary Rule in Immigration
Proceedings: Where It Was, Where It Is, Where It May Be Going, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 53, 62
(2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s rule in Lopez-Mendoza still governs removal proceedings . . . .”).
3. Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Population Decline of Unauthorized Immigrants Stalls, May Have
Reversed, PEW RES. HISP. TRENDS PROJECT (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/
09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-stalls-may-have-reversed/.
4. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2012 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 5 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov./sites/default/files/
publications/ois_yb_2012.pdf.
5. The number of removal proceedings received annually has increased by more than
100,000 since the year 2000 and currently sits at around 310,000. Compare EXECUTIVE OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2000 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at D1 (2001), available at http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/SYB2000Final.pdf (showing that the total number of removal cases
received by immigration courts in 2000 was 203,497), with EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at C3 (2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf (showing that the total number of removal cases
received by immigration courts in 2012 was 310,455).
6. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Immigration Prosecutions at Record Levels
in FY 2009, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Sept. 21, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/218/.
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Additionally, the recent “border crisis” has reignited a passionate debate
about the current issues facing our immigration system.8 This debate
further exemplifies the drastic changes that have occurred to our immi-
gration system over the last thirty years.
Even the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the change in the
“landscape of federal immigration law.”9 In one of its most recent immi-
gration decisions, Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court stated that defense
attorneys have a duty to advise their clients of the immigration conse-
quences of a criminal conviction or a guilty plea.10 This decision indi-
cates that the Court is starting to accept the idea that “deportation
proceedings occupy a special territory in between civil and criminal
proceedings.”11
7. Figure 1 is derived from Pew Research Center estimates based on government data. See
Passel et al., supra note 3. Estimates are in the millions. The shading surrounding the line
indicates low and high points of the estimated 90% confidence interval.
8. Ann M. Simmons, Flood of Children Across U.S. Border Reignites Immigration Debate,
L.A. TIMES (July 1, 2014, 5:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-nn-na-
immigration-chat-20140701-story.html.
9. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010).
10. See id. at 371 (“It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with
available advice about an issue like deportation . . . .”).
11. See Elizabeth A. Rossi, Revisiting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza: Why the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in Deportation Proceedings, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477,
501 (2013).
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The notion that immigration law and removal proceedings are now
more “quasi-criminal” than civil is at the heart of the exclusionary rule
debate.12 The criminalization of immigration means that both the
enforcement of immigration law and the punishment for immigration
violations are much harsher than they were when Lopez-Mendoza was
decided. Immigration law is often enforced through raids and other
aggressive tactics.13 Additionally, the increasing enforcement of immi-
gration law by state and local law enforcement officers has contributed
to the criminalization of immigration. Because of the manner in which
immigration laws are currently enforced, deportation is now often
thought of as punishment.14 These trends exemplify the degree to which
immigration law presently resembles criminal law. While much of the
enforcement is now the same, the procedural protections have not fol-
lowed.15 Because the immigration landscape has changed so drastically
in the past thirty years, the same, antiquated procedural schemes should
no longer be used. As such, the exclusionary rule must be applied in full
force to immigration proceedings in order to bring them in line with
criminal prosecutions.
This article will discuss how and why the exclusionary rule should
apply in full force in the immigration context. Part II of the article will
set out the history of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings,
starting prior to the Lopez-Mendoza decision, moving to the decision
itself, and then discussing how the lower courts have interpreted it. Next,
Part III will examine how the cost-benefit analysis that the Supreme
Court used to determine that the exclusionary rule need not apply in
removal hearings would come out much differently if the Court con-
ducted the analysis today. Part IV will then consider how the involve-
ment of state and local police officers has brought even more changes to
immigration enforcement. Lastly, Part V will argue that these changes
demonstrate that the cost-benefit analysis should be abandoned alto-
gether. Instead, the exclusionary rule should apply in full force to immi-
gration proceedings to advance the rule-of-law principles that the
exclusionary rule was originally designed to protect.
12. See Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the
Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 332 (2000).
13. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1573–75 (2010).
14. The Supreme Court recognized this notion in Padilla when it stated that the “severity of
deportation” makes it “the equivalent of banishment or exile.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373.
15. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1143.
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II. HISTORY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN
IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
A. Pre-INS v. Lopez-Mendoza
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
the exclusionary rule applied in deportation proceedings to exclude evi-
dence unlawfully obtained by federal agents.16 The Supreme Court had
never specifically addressed the subject, but it had stated in dicta in
Bilokumsky v. Tod17 that it could be assumed that illegally obtained evi-
dence must be excluded in removal proceedings.18 The leading treatise
on immigration law19 and a number of lower courts20 generally agreed
with the Supreme Court’s view that this type of evidence should be
excluded.21
This stance changed,22 however, in 1979 when the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (“BIA”) held in Matter of Sandoval23 that neither “legal
[n]or policy considerations dictate the exclusion of unlawfully seized
evidence from [removal] proceedings.”24 The BIA came to this decision
after applying the cost-benefit analysis25 first used in United States v.
Calandra26 and United States v. Janis.27 After Matter of Sandoval, the
BIA no longer considered the exclusionary rule to be mandatory in
removal proceedings but did still periodically exclude evidence for more
serious Fourth Amendment violations.28 This decision also led the BIA
16. See Bernard A. Nigro, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Proceedings, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 564, 572 (1986).
17. United States ex rel Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923).
18. See Rossi, supra note 11, at 487.
19. See CHARLES GORDON & HARRY N. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 5.2(c), at 5–31 (rev. ed. 1977) (“It is undisputed . . . that the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures applies in deportation proceedings, and that evidence
obtained as the result of an unlawful search cannot be used.”).
20. See Wong Chung Che v. INS, 565 F.2d 166, 169 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that if evidence
“was obtained through an illegal search, there is no authority of which we are aware that would
make it admissible” in a deportation proceeding); see also Benita-Mendez v. INS, 707 F.2d 1107,
1109 (9th Cir. 1983), modified, 748 F.2d 539, 540 (9th Cir. 1984); Ex parte Jackson, 263 F. 110,
112–13 (D. Mont. 1920), appeal dismissed, 267 F. 1022 (9th Cir. 1920).
21. See Rossi, supra note 11, at 487–88.
22. See Nigro, supra note 16, at 572; Rossi, supra note 11, at 488.
23. Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979).
24. Id. at 83.
25. See Rossi, supra note 11, at 488. The Court conducts the cost-benefit analysis by
weighing the benefit, or the deterrence value, against the societal costs of applying the
exclusionary rule in a particular instance. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349–51
(1974); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446–49 (1976).
26. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
27. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
28. See Rossi, supra note 11, at 488. For an example of a case where the BIA did exclude
evidence, see Matter of Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 1980). In Matter of Garcia, the BIA
excluded statements that were involuntarily made.  See id.
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to begin distinguishing between egregious and non-egregious viola-
tions.29 This distinction was later incorporated into the Lopez-Mendoza
opinion.30 The Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez-Mendoza was “the
first time post-Sandoval that the Article III courts [squarely] addressed
whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applie[d] in deporta-
tion proceedings.”31
B. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza
In Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court held for the first time that
the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation proceedings.32
This case involved two individuals, Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias
Sandoval-Sanchez, whose cases had been consolidated.33 Immigration
and Naturalization Service (“INS”) agents arrested both respondents at
their place of work.34 In both cases, the agents did not have warrants and
were essentially conducting a raid.35 During questioning, both Lopez-
Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez admitted their unlawful entry into the
United States.36 After Lopez-Mendoza’s admission, the agents prepared
an I-213 Record of Deportable Alien (“I-213”) and an affidavit.37
Lopez-Mendoza signed these papers, thereby acknowledging his Mexi-
can nationality and illegal entry into the United States.38 Lopez-Men-
doza had a hearing before an immigration judge where he moved to
terminate the proceedings based on his illegal arrest.39 The judge held
that the legality of the arrest was not relevant to the deportation hearing
and refused to rule on it.40 The judge then found Lopez-Mendoza
deportable based on the I-213 and affidavit that he had signed.41
The BIA dismissed Lopez-Mendoza’s subsequent appeal, agreeing
with the immigration judge that the illegal arrest had no bearing on the
deportation proceeding and noting that Lopez-Mendoza had not objected
29. See Rossi, supra note 11, at 489 (“[T]he BIA sought to distinguish between garden
variety Fourth Amendment violations and those that were ‘egregious’ and violated notions of
fundamental fairness under the Fifth Amendment.”).
30. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984); see also Rossi, supra note 11, at
489.
31. Rossi, supra note 11, at 490.
32. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034, 1041.
33. Id. at 1034. See Rossi, supra note 11, at 490.
34. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035–36.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1035, 1037.
37. Id. at 1035.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1035.
41. Id. at 1035–36.
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to the admission of the I-213 or the affidavit.42 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit then vacated the order of deportation and remanded for
a determination of whether Lopez-Mendoza’s Fourth Amendment rights
had been violated.43
At his hearing, Sandoval-Sanchez moved to suppress the evidence
against him as the fruit of an unlawful arrest, but the immigration judge
rejected this claim.44 Like in Lopez-Mendoza’s case, the immigration
judge found that the legality of the arrest was not relevant to the deporta-
tion hearing.45 The judge found Sandoval-Sanchez deportable.46
The BIA dismissed Sandoval-Sanchez’s subsequent appeal, stating
that the circumstances of his arrest had not affected the voluntariness of
his admission.47 In this case, however, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that Sandoval-Sanchez’s detention had violated the
Fourth Amendment.48 Because his statements were a product of his
detention, the court held that they were barred by the exclusionary
rule.49 The deportation order was thus reversed.50
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the case by stating that
“[a] deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibil-
ity to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry.”51 The
Court went on to say that the purpose of deportation is not to punish past
transgressions but to stop continuing violations of immigration law.52
The Court then summarily disposed of Lopez-Mendoza’s claim because
he had only objected to being summoned to the deportation hearing and
not to the evidence offered against him.53 The Court stated that “[t]he
42. Id. at 1036.
43. Id. The court in Lopez-Mendoza v. INS stated, “[i]f the Fourth Amendment is to retain its
vitality as guardian of the privacy of citizens and non-citizens alike, the federal judiciary must be
constantly vigilant in ensuring adherence to its commands by those charged with enforcing our
laws. We are convinced that the best and indeed the only realistic way to ensure that immigration
officers respect the precious values embodied in the Fourth Amendment is to apply the
exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings.” Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d 1059, 1075 (9th
Cir. 1983), rev’d, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
44. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1037.
45. Id.




50. Id. at 1038.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1039. After the Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States, however, a violation of
immigration law is no longer considered an ongoing crime. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012) (“As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present
in the United States.”).
53. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040. In order for Lopez-Mendoza’s claim to be viable, he
would have needed to object to the “statements and other evidence obtained as a result of [his]
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-1\MIA103.txt unknown Seq: 8  4-DEC-14 11:01
298 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:291
‘body’ or identity of a defendant in a criminal or civil proceeding is
never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest.”54 Unlike
Lopez-Mendoza, Sandoval-Sanchez did object to the evidence offered
against him.55 Despite not being the named respondent, it was his claim
that formed the basis for the remainder of the opinion.56
The Court decided to use the cost-benefit analysis laid out in
United States v. Janis57 to determine whether the exclusionary rule
should apply to deportation proceedings.58 In Janis, the question before
the Court was whether the exclusionary rule should apply to a federal
civil tax assessment proceeding to exclude evidence unlawfully seized
by state, not federal, officials.59 In that opinion, the Court stated that the
benefit of applying the exclusionary rule was “to deter future unlawful
police conduct” while the costs were the loss of probative evidence and
other secondary costs associated with a less accurate adjudication.60 The
Court in Janis ultimately decided that the exclusionary rule should not
apply in the federal civil tax assessment context.61
In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court began by looking at the benefit, or the
deterrence value, of applying the exclusionary rule to deportation pro-
ceedings.62 The Court identified two reasons why the deterrence value
may be significant in deportation proceedings.63 First, while the evi-
dence collected could be excluded from parallel criminal prosecutions,
which may supply some “residual deterrence,” only a small percentage
of immigration cases were criminally prosecuted.64 This meant that an
agent’s primary objective was to use the evidence in the civil proceed-
ings.65 Second, a deportation proceeding was one of the instances where
the exclusionary rule could be at its most effective because the same
agency that arrested the unlawful immigrant also brought the deportation
unlawful, warrantless arrest” rather than just his “compelled presence” at the deportation hearing.
Id.
54. Id. at 1039.
55. Id. at 1040.
56. Id.
57. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
58. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041.
59. Id.; see also Janis, 428 U.S. at 434.
60. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041.
61. Id. at 1042. Through this holding, the Court began to craft a civil-criminal distinction
within exclusionary rule jurisprudence. See Janis, 428 U.S. at 459–60 (1976) (“[T]he judicially
created exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use in the civil proceeding of one
sovereign . . . of evidence illegally seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of another
sovereign . . . .”) (emphasis added).
62. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1042.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1042–43.
65. Id. at 1043.
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Nonetheless, the Court went on to discuss several factors that
reduced the deterrent effect.67 First, deportation was possible when evi-
dence independent from the arrest could still prove alienage.68 As the
Court previously noted, the person or identity of the respondent was not
suppressible.69 Additionally, the respondent’s silence could be used as
evidence of alienage, unlike in a criminal case where a defendant’s
silence could not be used as evidence of guilt.70 Second, in the vast
majority of cases, the circumstances surrounding the arrest were not
challenged so officers were unlikely to base their conduct on possible
exclusion at a future hearing.71 Third, and according to the Court “per-
haps most important,” the INS had its own comprehensive scheme for
deterring Fourth Amendment violations.72 This scheme included “rules
restricting stop, interrogation, and arrest practices,” “instruction and
examination in Fourth Amendment law” for immigration officers, and “a
procedure for investigating and punishing [those] who commit Fourth
Amendment violations.”73 The Court stated that “[t]he INS’s attention to
Fourth Amendment interests cannot guarantee that constitutional viola-
tions will not occur, but it does reduce the likely deterrent value of the
exclusionary rule.”74 Lastly, the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule
was further undermined by the availability of alternative remedies for
those who suffer Fourth Amendment violations, such as civil suits or
police disciplinary proceedings.75
Before discussing the social costs, the Court rejected the respon-
dents’ argument that the use of the exclusionary rule in deportation pro-
ceedings was necessary to protect the rights of all citizens, especially
66. Id. This is still true today although the name of the agency itself has changed. When
Lopez-Mendoza was decided, the name of the agency was INS, or Immigration and Naturalization
Service. Now it is referred to as ICE, or Immigration and Customs Enforcement. See Overview,
ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
67. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. This statement is no longer entirely accurate. Shortly after the Court’s decision in
Lopez-Mendoza, the BIA in 1991 ruled that federal immigration authorities cannot meet their
burden of proving alienage by relying on the respondent’s silence alone. See Matter of Guevara,
20 I. & N. Dec. 238, 242 (BIA 1990) (“[T]he respondent’s silence alone does not provide
sufficient evidence, in the absence of any other evidence of record at all, to establish a prima facie
case of alienage, sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the respondent . . . .”).
71. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1044–45.
74. Id. at 1045.
75. Id.; see also Nigro, supra note 16, at 582 (discussing alternative remedies for Fourth
Amendment violations, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Bivens action).
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Hispanic-Americans.76 The Court stated that those lawfully in the coun-
try are only interested in the exclusionary rule for its future deterrent
effect because it provided no remedy for completed wrongs.77 For the
reasons previously discussed, the Court found that the application of the
exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings would have little addi-
tional deterrent effect.78 Therefore, it was unlikely to materially contrib-
ute to the protection of citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.79
The Court in Lopez-Mendoza next discussed the social costs associ-
ated with applying the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings. It
labeled these costs “both unusual and significant.”80 The first major cost
discussed by the Court was that applying the exclusionary rule in the
immigration context “require[d] the courts to close their eyes to [the]
ongoing violations” that immigration proceedings were meant to pre-
vent.81 In a nod to one of its most famous jurists, Justice Cardozo,82 the
Court stated that “[t]he constable’s blunder may allow the criminal to go
free, but we have never suggested that it allows the criminal to continue
in the commission of an ongoing crime.”83
The second major cost discussed by the Court was that the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule would interfere with the then-“streamlined”
deportation hearing system.84 The Court quoted the BIA’s prior assess-
ment of applying the exclusionary rule to immigration proceedings,
which stated that “[t]he ensuing delays and inordinate amount of time
spent on such cases at all levels has an adverse impact on the effective
administration of the immigration laws.”85 This situation was exacer-
bated by the high volume of arrests, which made it very difficult to
record the precise circumstances of each arrest.86 At the time, an officer
simply completed an I-213, but a suppression hearing would have
required more, including the officer’s presence at the hearing.87 Accord-
76. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1045–46.
77. Id. at 1046.
78. Id.
79. Id. (“Important as it is to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all persons, there is no
convincing indication that application of the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings
will contribute materially to that end.”).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. During his time on the New York Court of Appeals, then-Judge Cardozo famously stated
that “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.” People v. Defore, 150 N.E.
585, 587 (1926).
83. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1047.
84. Id. at 1048. At the time of the decision, the system was “streamlined to permit the quick
resolution of very large numbers of deportation actions,” on average six deportation hearings a
day. Id.
85. Id. at 1048–49 (quoting Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 80 (BIA 1979)).
86. Id. at 1049.
87. Id.
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ing to the Court, the burden on officers would have frustrated the admin-
istration of the immigration laws.88
Finally, the Court examined how the application of the exclusion-
ary rule could result in the suppression of large quantities of evidence
that was obtained lawfully.89 INS agents often conducted mass arrests
under confusing circumstances, which made it difficult to ascertain the
precise information necessary for a suppression hearing.90 Instead, INS
agents may only have been able to testify that they followed INS proto-
col.91 The demand for an exact account of what happened at each arrest
would have precluded mass arrests, even when the INS was faced with a
group of illegal immigrants.92 According to the INS, this difficulty could
have arisen even if everything was done in compliance with the Fourth
Amendment.93
Based on the above analysis of the costs and benefits, the Court
determined that the exclusionary rule should not apply in civil deporta-
tion hearings.94 The Court did, however, carve out two possible excep-
tions—the first being for “egregious violations of the Fourth
Amendment or other liberties that might transgress the notions of funda-
mental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence
obtained,” and the second being “if there developed good reason to
believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were wide-
spread.”95 The meanings of both of these exceptions have been the sub-
ject of much debate.96
C. Post-INS v. Lopez-Mendoza
In the wake of the Lopez-Mendoza ruling, the BIA began relying
more heavily on the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to adjudi-
cate constitutional violations regarding fundamental fairness, even when
the violations involved unreasonable searches and seizures.97 However,
when the BIA address Fourth Amendment claims, its approach is to
apply the law of the federal court of appeals that governs in the jurisdic-
88. Id.
89. See id. at 1049.
90. Id. at 1049–50.
91. Id. at 1049.
92. Id. at 1049–50.
93. Id. at 1050.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1050–51.
96. See generally Rossi, supra note 11, at 503–30 (discussing how the “egregious violations”
exception has created more constitutional litigation, not less); Elias, supra note 2, at 1113–40
(discussing how the “widespread exception” has historically been forgotten but that recently more
suppression motions have been based on this exception).
97. See Scharf, supra note 2, at 76.
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tion from which the case arose.98 Additionally, the courts of appeals
began to weigh in on the meanings of the exceptions created in Lopez-
Mendoza, leading to a variety of different interpretations for these
exceptions.99
III. WHY THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS USED IN LOPEZ-MENDOZA
WOULD PRODUCE A DIFFERENT RESULT TODAY
In Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court set out a multi-factor test
with which it determined that the social costs of applying the exclusion-
ary rule outweighed the benefits of excluding illicit evidence.100 As dis-
cussed above, these factors were that 1) immigration proceedings are
civil in nature; 2) the majority of individuals do not challenge the cir-
cumstances of their arrest; 3) internal deterrence mechanisms exist; and
4) alternative civil remedies are available.101 However, these factors no
longer weigh in the same direction because of the changes in “immigra-
tion jurisprudence [and] the practice of immigration enforcement” that
have occurred over the past thirty years, in addition to the changing
“realities of life for immigrant communities.”102 As a result of these
changes, all four factors, if fairly and comprehensively assessed, would
produce an entirely different result today.
A. The Criminalization of Immigration Law
In 1984, when Lopez-Mendoza was decided, the Court character-
ized deportation proceedings as “purely civil action[s].”103 Today that is
no longer the case because of the increasing criminalization of immigra-
tion laws that has occurred over the past thirty years.104 This criminal-
ization occurred through “the creation of new immigration-related
crimes, an increase in the minimum and maximum sentences of existing
immigration crimes, an increase in the fines imposed on immigrant
98. See id. at 82.
99. See id. at 62–63. Compare Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating
that an egregious violation is characterized by “threats, coercion, or physical abuse”), with
Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that any bad faith violation of
the Fourth Amendment is an egregious violation). For a complete discussion of the different
approaches to the egregious violation exception, see Rossi, supra note 11, at 526–30; Scharf,
supra note 2, at 62–69.
100. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038, 1043–45.
101. See supra Part II.B.
102. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1141.
103. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038.
104. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1141–46. See generally Ira Kurzban, Criminalizing
Immigration Law, in 42ND ANNUAL IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 321 (2009)
(reflecting on the history of criminalizing immigration law and the current paradigm of
criminalizing civil conduct in immigration law).
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defendants, and far greater numbers of prosecutions being brought for
the commission of all immigration-related crimes.”105 While the change
occurred over a number of years, the events of September 11, 2001
accelerated it.106 After September 11, immigration prosecutions
increased continually, reaching their highest point in fiscal year 2013 at
nearly 100,000 prosecutions.107 Additionally, immigration prosecutions
now make up the largest single category of federal prosecutions per
month.108
The harsh tactics used to enforce civil immigration law also exem-
plify its criminalization.109 For example, militarized raids are often con-
ducted to round up individuals that entered the country unlawfully.110
Once apprehended, those challenging their deportations are held in harsh
conditions that are similar to prison.111 In fact, detainees are often
housed in county jails, sometimes even in the general population.112
105. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1142. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.) (rendering individuals convicted of minor crimes
with sentences of less than five years eligible for deportation); Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) (making it a criminal offense for a noncitizen to
attempt an unlawful reentry into the United States after having been convicted of three
misdemeanors involving either drugs or crimes against the person); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345, 102 Stat. 4181, 4471 (1988) (codified as amended at 1028 U.S.C.
§ 1326) (increasing the criminal sentences for the offenses of unlawful reentry after deportation, if
deportation resulted from a felony (more if the underlying crime was an “aggravated felony”)); 8
U.S.C. §§ 1282, 1325–28 (2006) (increasing criminal fines for certain immigration-related
crimes).
106. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1143.
107. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, At Nearly 100,000 Immigration
Prosecutions Reach All-time High in FY 2013, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Nov. 25, 2013), http://trac.
syr.edu/immigration/reports/336/.
108. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Prosecutions for October 2013, TRAC
REPORTS (Jan. 13, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/overall/monthlyoct13/fil/.
109. See Chacón, supra note 13, at 1574.
110. Id. at 1574–75. See, e.g., BESS CHIU ET AL., CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC,
CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID OPERATIONS 13–14, 19 (2009)
available at http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/9780415996945/human-rights/cardozo.pdf (“[I]n
Minnesota, the news reported that ICE agents showed up wearing bulletproof vests and armed
with guns. They pushed their way into homes and terrified the children.”). For further examples of
aggressive enforcement tactics, see id. at 17–22.
111. See Chacón, supra note 13, at 1577–79; see also Hannah Rappleye & Lisa Riordan
Seville, Flood of Immigrant Families at Border Revives Dormant Detention Program, NBC NEWS
(July 25, 2014, 5:39 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/flood-
immigrant-families-border-revives-dormant-detention-program-n164461 (discussing that the
current “border crisis” is “prompting the Obama administration to revive a much-criticized
detention program that previously led to children and their parents being held for extended periods
of time in harsh prison-like conditions”).
112. See The Money Trail, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.
org/node/2393 (last visited July 31, 2014) (“[Sixty-seven percent] of immigrants in administrative
ICE custody are housed in local facilities, often alongside prisoners serving criminal sentences.”).
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Immigration detainees are held in prison-like conditions, and often
treated like criminal detainees, despite the fact that in the majority of
cases there are no criminal charges at stake.113 The use of these methods
makes present enforcement of immigration laws much more like crimi-
nal enforcement than civil enforcement.114
Lastly, the criminalization of immigration law is exemplified by the
fact that deportation is much more like a form of punishment115 now
than it was when Lopez-Mendoza was decided.116 In fact, some amend-
ments to our immigration laws seem to have been passed with the intent
to punish.117 For example, through the passage of the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act118 (“IIRIRA”), Congress
intended to deport individuals for prior offenses even if courts might
determine that there is a legitimate reason for them to stay.119 Because
of this, some of the new rules destroy families and remove individuals
who are making contributions to society.120 These rules constitute pun-
ishment because they do not leave the courts any discretion to decide
whether to allow individuals to stay,121 nor do they give serious consid-
eration to family rights, which have been recognized as fundamental by
United States courts and international tribunals.122 The new rules
promulgated by Congress have made the statutory framework itself
Additionally, the growth of the private prison industry over the past thirty years evidences the
criminalization of immigration law. See id.; Chacón, supra note 13, at 1578.
113. See Chacón, supra note 13, at 1578.
114. Id. at 1574, 1577.
115. In Fong Yue Ting, one of the Supreme Court’s early immigration cases, the Court stated
that “[t]he order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.” Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). Approximately fifty years later, the Court had changed its mind, stating
in Bridges v. Wixon that, “[t]hough deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a
great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this
land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted.”
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
116. See Chacón, supra note 13, at 1573–74.
117. See Pauw, supra note 12, at 333–34 (“The legislative history underlying IIRIRA reveals
that the criminal grounds of deportation were expanded in order to punish offenders. According to
Senator Roth, for example, IIRIRA expanded the grounds of deportation ‘to include more crimes
punishable by deportation.’ Senator Abraham described the sentiments underlying IIRIRA as
follows: ‘You don’t shut down the borders. What you do is you say we’re going to apply the
criminal laws more harshly.’”).
118. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 28
U.S.C.).
119. See Pauw, supra note 12, at 334.
120. See id. at 335.
121. See id.
122. See id. at n.159. But see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (holding that a statute that
discriminates against the illegitimate children of fathers who are United States citizens does not
violate equal protection); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 590–91 (deciding that there
was no violation of due process even though deportation imposes hardship on families); Knauff v.
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penal.123
Unfortunately, the increase in the criminalization of immigration
law has not been coupled with a corresponding increase in procedural
protections for those in deportation proceedings, thus creating an imbal-
ance, or an “asymmetric incorporation of criminal justice norms.”124 In
order to rectify this imbalance, we must recognize that immigration pro-
ceedings are at least “quasi-criminal” in nature.125 We must also reject
the all-or-nothing approach for determining whether deportation pro-
ceedings are civil or criminal and provide a middle ground where at least
some constitutional protections apply.126 The middle ground should
apply when the purpose of the sanction is punitive as opposed to reme-
dial, and it ought to protect an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights
because it is unacceptable for a punishment to be imposed based on
illegally obtained evidence.127 However, there may be other rights
afforded to criminal defendants that do not need to be included in the
middle ground—for example, the right to a jury trial.128
B. The Increase in Motions to Suppress
When the Court decided Lopez-Mendoza in 1984, it cited the lack
of challenges to arrests as one of the reasons why the deterrence value of
using the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings would be low.129
There is no longer a lack of challenges to arrests, however, as motions to
suppress are being filed with increased frequency.130 According to a
study conducted by the Cardozo School of Law, there was a nine-fold
increase in the filing of suppression motions from 2006 to 2009 com-
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544–46 (1950) (holding that the exclusion from the United States of
the wife of a veteran who was a United States citizen did not violate due process).
123. See Pauw, supra note 12, at 338.
124. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1143; see also Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 469, 472 (2007) (“A pattern has emerged: Those features of the criminal justice model that
can roughly be classified as enforcement have indeed been imported. Those that relate to
adjudication—in particular, the bundle of procedural rights recognized in criminal cases—have
been consciously rejected. . . . [I]mmigration law has been absorbing the theories, methods,
perceptions, and priorities of the criminal enforcement model while rejecting the [highly
protective] criminal adjudication model in favor of a civil regulatory regime.”).
125. Pauw, supra note 12, at 323.
126. See id. at 319.
127. See generally id. at 325–44 (discussing the difference between remedial measures and
punitive measures and why constitutional protections are necessary when a sanction is punitive).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
129. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1984).
130. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1124–25 (“[R]espondents in immigration proceedings have
argued with increasing frequency that evidence against them should be suppressed because it was
obtained illegally by government officials whose actions violated the respondents’ constitutional
rights.”).
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pared to an equal period of time immediately preceding 2006.131
The Cardozo study also offered insight as to why there has been
such an increase in suppression motions. First, the study found that
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents often fail to
obtain lawful consent before entering a home.132 Second, the data indi-
cates that there is a high percentage of collateral arrests, meaning that
ICE agents are arresting other individuals in addition to their original
targets.133 The “high percentage of collateral arrests is consistent with
allegations that ICE agents are using home raids for purported targets as
a pretext to enter homes and illegally seize mere civil immigration viola-
tors, in order to meet inflated arrest expectations.”134 Additionally, the
majority of arrest records provided no basis for the initial seizure,
despite the requirement that ICE have some reasonable suspicion.135
Lastly, the data reveals a troubling trend of racial profiling,136 specifi-
cally toward Hispanic individuals, who are overrepresented in the collat-
eral arrests category.137 Constitutional violations such as these by ICE
officers are likely the reason for the increase in suppression motions.138
C. The Inadequacy of ICE’s Own Regulations as a Deterrent
In its opinion in Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court cited the exis-
tence of ICE’s own standards and policies as a reason why the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule to deportation hearings was unnecessary.139
Nevertheless, these policies have proven to be ineffective.140 In fact,
even at the time that Lopez-Mendoza was decided, Justice White, in his
dissent, pointed out that the government was unable to provide even one
131. See CHIU, supra note 110, at 13–14. The raw numbers are five motions pre-2006 and
forty-eight motions post-2006. The year 2006 was chosen because that is when Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) instituted its new arrest performance expectations. To understand
how this data was collected, see id. at 13.
132. See id. at 10.
133. See id. at 11.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Racial profiling is a factor used to determine whether an “egregious violation” has
occurred. See, e.g., Ghysels-Reals v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 418 F. App’x 894, 895 (11th Cir. 2011).
137. See CHIU, supra note 110, at 12.
138. For various examples of ICE misconduct, see id. at 17–22. One example from North
Bergen, New Jersey in 2008 involved a tenant who opened her door, and then ICE agents searched
her entire apartment without permission. This individual was eventually arrested even though she
had recently been granted legal immigration status and had documents to prove it. Id. at 17.
Another more violent example states that “ICE agents took out their guns, banged on a door, and
forced their way [into the home] once the tenant opened the door to find out who was there. ICE
agents entered illegally and searched the home.” Id. at 19.
139. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044–45 (1984).
140. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1146–50.
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example where the ICE regulations had been used.141 As discussed
above, ICE agents are too frequently failing to obtain consent to enter
homes, detaining people without reasonable suspicion, and engaging in
racial profiling—all of which go against their regulations.142
In addition to these issues, the ICE training scheme that the Lopez-
Mendoza majority emphasized as helping “to ensure that immigration
officers adhered to their regulations” has not been successful.143 One
case in particular exemplifies the problems with ICE’s training
procedures:
[Pedro] Guzman, a U.S. citizen with learning difficulties, was appre-
hended by the Los Angeles police on a trespassing and vandalism
charge, handed over to ICE, and mistakenly deported to Mexico.
Guzman survived for three months wandering along the border, eat-
ing garbage and bathing in the Tijuana River before finally convinc-
ing a border official to allow him to reenter the United States.144
This example demonstrates “the extent to which ICE’s training proce-
dures fail to guarantee that immigration officers will follow the agency’s
guidelines and therefore fail to prevent violations of individuals’ consti-
tutional rights.”145
In response to the allegations that ICE is not following its own
regulations, ICE claims that the INS regulations no longer apply to them
because ICE is “a new, distinct agency that need not adhere to INS
legacy subregulatory rules and guidelines.”146 The immigration defense
bar vehemently opposes this position.147 The argument between these
parties shows how much the regulation of immigration proceedings has
changed since the Lopez-Mendoza decision.148 Regardless of whether
the regulations no longer apply to ICE or are simply not being followed,
141. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1054 (White, J., dissenting).
142. See supra Part III.B; see also Elias, supra note 2, at 1147–48. These regulations include
“rules restricting stop, interrogation, and arrest practices,” “instruction and examination in Fourth
Amendment law” for immigration officers, and “a procedure for investigating and punishing
[those] who commit Fourth Amendment violations.” Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044–45.
143. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1148.
144. Id. at 1148–49.
145. Id. at 1148.
146. Id. at 1149.
147. See id. The immigration defense bar is likely correct because the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, which created the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), reassigned all of INS’s
detention and removal duties to DHS. See 6 U.S.C. § 251 (2012) (“[T]here shall be transferred
from the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization to the Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security all functions performed under . . . [t]he detention and removal program.”).
In addition, ICE’s argument “directly contravenes one of the guiding principles of administrative
law.” Elias, supra note 2, at 1149 n.248.
148. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1149 (discussing that the argument between ICE and the
immigration defense bar demonstrates “the degree to which regulatory oversight of immigration
enforcement has changed since Lopez-Mendoza was decided in 1984”).
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it is clear that they are not effectively deterring ICE agents from com-
mitting Fourth Amendment violations like the Lopez-Mendoza Court
thought they would.
D. The Unavailability of Alternative Remedies
Another reason cited by the Court in Lopez-Mendoza for not apply-
ing the exclusionary rule to immigration proceedings was the availabil-
ity of alternative remedies that could be used by immigrants to cure a
constitutional violation.149 However, alternative remedies have actually
proven to be largely unavailable to those in removal proceedings.150 Jus-
tice White discussed this in his Lopez-Mendoza dissent, stating that the
idea that civil suits provide protection is “unrealistic.”151 He went on to
explain that:
[c]ontrary to the situation in criminal cases, once the Government has
improperly obtained evidence against an illegal alien, he is removed
from the country and is therefore in no position to file civil actions in
federal courts. Moreover, those who are legally in the country but are
nonetheless subjected to illegal searches and seizures are likely to be
poor and uneducated, and many will not speak English. It is doubtful
that the threat of civil suits by these persons will strike fear into the
hearts of those who enforce the Nation’s immigration laws.152
While Justice White foreshadowed the problems with alternative
remedies in 1984, the situation of undocumented immigrants has only
worsened since then.153 The immigrant population is more vulnerable,
isolated, and legally marginalized than it was in 1984.154 This is largely
because of two occurrences—the Supreme Court ruling in United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez155 and September 11, 2001.156 In Verdugo-
Urquidez, the Supreme Court narrowed the class of people protected by
the Fourth Amendment, stating that “the people protected by the Fourth
Amendment . . . refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connections
with the country to be considered part of that community.”157 After this
149. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1045 (1984).
150. See Matthew S. Mulqueen, Rethinking the Role of the Exclusionary Rule in Removal
Proceedings, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1157, 1194 (2008); see also Nigro, supra note 16, at 587
(“Alternative remedies, such as Bivens-type damage actions, do not protect Fourth Amendment
rights as effectively as the exclusionary rule does.”).
151. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1055 (White, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1151.
154. See id.
155. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
156. See id. at 265; see also Elias, supra note 2, at 1151.
157. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (internal quotations omitted).
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ruling, there was much debate over the applicability of Fourth Amend-
ment protections to legal residents and undocumented immigrants in
both criminal and civil proceedings.158 Some courts have gone so far as
to hold that noncitizens have no Fourth Amendment rights.159 Without
any Fourth Amendment rights, noncitizens have no standing to sue for a
civil remedy. Therefore, interpretations of this sort render noncitizens
powerless to seek any type of civil relief, like Justice White discussed in
his Lopez-Mendoza dissent.160
After September 11, “a number of statutory measures and agency
schemes were introduced that further restricted the rights of aliens held
by the federal government.”161 Moreover, the 1996 amendments to the
Immigration and Nationality Act curtailed immigration respondents’
access to meaningful judicial review.162 Additionally, as Justice White
noted, immigrants are often deported before they even have the chance
to seek any alternative remedies.163 In effect, this fact makes civil reme-
dies useless to undocumented immigrants in deportation proceedings.164
Further, a civil remedy would not redress the injury to the respondent
because it would provide monetary damages but not afford the individ-
ual the right to stay in the country.165 Immigration respondents already
lacked means to vindicate their constitutional rights in 1984, and these
opportunities have become even more limited in 2014.166
IV. HOW THE INVOLVEMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE OFFICERS
IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT FURTHER MODIFIES THE
LOPEZ-MENDOZA COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
In 1984, when Lopez-Mendoza was decided, the primary enforcers
of immigration law were federal immigration agents.167 Today, how-
158. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1151.
159. See id. at 1152; see, e.g., United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1255
(N.D. Utah 2003) (“The court concludes that as a previously-removed alien felon, Esparza-
Mendoza cannot assert a violation of the Fourth Amendment because he is not one of ‘the People’
the Amendment protects.”).
160. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1152; see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1055
(1984) (White, J., dissenting).
161. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1152.
162. See id. at 1153.
163. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1055 (White, J., dissenting).
164. See Mulqueen, supra note 150, at 1194; CHIU, supra note 110, at 25. See also Scott E.
Sundby, Everyman’s Exclusionary Rule: The Exclusionary Rule and the Rule of Law (or Why
Conservatives Should Embrace the Exclusionary Rule), 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 393, 406 n.49
(2013) (discussing the ineffectiveness of alternative remedies even in the criminal context).
165. Oral Argument at 31:07–32:35, Andres Jimenez-Domingo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 12-
14048 (11th Cir. Dec. 5, 2013).
166. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1154.
167. See Chacón, supra note 13, at 1579 (stating that local and state police involvement in
immigration enforcement is a “relatively recent development”).
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ever, states and localities have increasingly taken on the role of enforc-
ing immigration law,168 making such enforcement part of the officers’
“zone of primary interest.”169 State and local law enforcement of federal
immigration law occurs “through formal agreements under Section
287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; through participation in
Secure Communities and the Criminal Alien Program; through state
laws such as those enacted in Arizona, Alabama, and elsewhere; and
through policies promoted by local mayors, sheriffs, and police
chiefs.”170 In a recent study, twelve percent of police chiefs “reported
that their local governments ‘expect their department to take a proactive
role in deterring unauthorized immigration in all of [the department’s]
activities.’”171 Additionally, a nationwide survey of police chiefs found
that eighty-seven percent of large city police departments and eighty-
nine percent of county sheriff’s offices check the immigration status of
people arrested for a violent crime.172 Even in the event of an arrest for a
non-violent crime with no prior record, fifty-one percent of large city
police departments and sixty-seven percent of county sheriff’s offices
check the immigration status of the individual arrested.173
A. Additional Modifications to the Lopez-Mendoza
Cost-Benefit Analysis
The increase in state and local law enforcement involvement in
immigration law significantly changes the Court’s cost-benefit analysis
from Lopez-Mendoza in ways that go beyond the reasoning discussed
above.174 First, the involvement of these officers itself enhances the
criminalization of immigration law because they are supposed to enforce
state criminal law, not federal immigration law.175 Because they spend
168. LEGAL ACTION CTR., MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: CRACKING
DOWN ON FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS BY STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
9 (2013), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/motions_to_suppress_
in_removal_proceedings-_cracking_down_on_fourth_amendment_violations.pdf (“In recent
years, numerous states, and even some localities, have taken a strong interest in assisting the
federal government with immigration enforcement.”) [hereinafter PRACTICE ADVISORY].
169. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976); see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-
1051(B) (2010); ALA. CODE § 31-13-12 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-100(b) (2012).
170. See PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 168, at 1.
171. Paul G. Lewis et al., Why Do (Some) City Police Departments Enforce Federal
Immigration Law? Political, Demographic, and Organizational Influences on Local Choices, 23 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 1, 11–12 (2013).
172. See Monica Varsanyi et al., Immigration Federalism: Which Policy Prevails?,
MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Oct. 2012), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.
cfm?ID=909.
173. See id.
174. See supra Part III.
175. See CHIU, supra note 110, at 26 (discussing how the perceived or actual cooperation
between ICE and local law enforcement has made the job of local police officers more difficult).
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more time in the community, local law enforcement officers build a rela-
tionship of trust with immigrants, but enforcing immigration law puts
this relationship at risk.176 Enforcing immigration law also hinders the
police’s ability to achieve their primary goal, crime reduction.177
Undocumented immigrants will not be willing to report crimes to the
police if they are concerned about possible immigration conse-
quences.178 Additionally, police training leads officers to use criminal
enforcement methods, which are likely to be harsher in nature.
Next, the ICE internal rules, which have proven to be ineffective
for ICE,179 do not apply to local law enforcement officers.180 Therefore,
the only way to deter local law enforcement is through the same deter-
rence method used when enforcing criminal law—the exclusionary rule.
This will protect all individuals, including citizens, from being targeted
by local police officers as undocumented individuals.181 Despite Section
287(g) agreements, local law enforcement officers are not well trained in
federal immigration law, thus making it even more difficult for them to
properly enforce it.182 Lastly, the disjointed enforcement of immigration
law by a number of different state and local law enforcement agencies
makes it difficult to identify a central authority against which to file civil
suits.183 Moreover, this fragmented enforcement of immigration law cre-
176. See Lewis et al., supra note 171, at 4, 10 (“Since the emergence of community policing as
a professional philosophy, police have sought to gain the trust and confidence of local community
members by emphasizing close communication and collaboration between police and residents, an
approach that has become the archetype for police work.”). For a more complete discussion of the
community policing model, see generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (1994), available
at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp.pdf.
177. See CHIU, supra note 110, at 14.
178. See id.
179. See supra Part III.C.
180. See PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 168, at 2 (suggesting that local law enforcement
officers are only subject to federal regulations if acting under a Section 287(g) agreement, a
formal agreement between the federal government and state or local law enforcement officers that
enables those officers to perform duties of federal immigration officers).
181. See, e.g., Lewis et al., supra note 171, at 4 (stating that racial profiling is an issue with
local law enforcement of immigration law); see also Maria João Guia, Crimmigration,
Securitisation and the Criminal Law of the Crimmigrant, in SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE 17, 20,
34–35 (Maria João Guia et al. eds., 2013) (discussing that the immigrant is a “target of permanent
suspicion”).
182. See PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 168, at 13 (“[S]tate and local law enforcement
officers who are not operating under a Section 287(g) agreement do not receive federal
immigration training.”).
183. See id. (“Where state and local officers detain or arrest an individual for suspected
immigration violations, [ ] there is no ‘agency under central federal control,’ that can be held
accountable. Without a single target for declaratory relief, few tools are available to deter
constitutional violations other than the exclusionary rule.”).
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ates confusion and “promotes inconsistent enforcement practices.”184
B. How the Janis Balancing Test is Distinguishable in the
Immigration Context
In United States v. Janis, the Supreme Court decided that the exclu-
sionary rule should not be applied in a federal civil tax proceeding to
evidence illegally obtained by state law enforcement officers.185 The
Court determined that applying the exclusionary rule would be inappro-
priate because there would be a minimal deterrent effect on the state
officials from excluding the evidence.186 The Court discussed three rea-
sons for applying the “silver platter” doctrine in this context.187 The rea-
sons cited were the following: (1) “a state court had already suppressed
the evidence from a state criminal tax proceeding”; (2) “state officers
did not care very much about the outcome of federal civil tax proceed-
ings, and therefore would not be prone to committing constitutional vio-
lations in order to obtain evidence for those proceedings”; and (3) “even
if state officers did care about the outcome of federal proceedings, the
suppression of evidence in a federal criminal trial would suffice to deter
state officer misconduct.”188
In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court applied the same cost-benefit analysis
from Janis to the immigration context.189 There are several reasons,
however, why local immigration enforcement is different from local or
state tax enforcement.190 These differences make it inappropriate to
apply the Janis balancing test, and in turn the silver platter doctrine, to
immigration proceedings.
First, evidence for a federal civil tax proceeding can also be sup-
pressed in a state criminal tax proceeding.191 Local law enforcement
would likely be deterred by suppression in the state case, meaning that
there would be “limited additional deterrent benefit” from suppression in
the federal civil proceeding.192 Unlike in the tax context, however, there
are no parallel state immigration proceedings because the federal gov-
184. Linda Reyna Yanez & Alfonso Soto, Local Police Involvement in the Enforcement of
Immigration Law, 1 HISP. L.J. 9, 31 (1994).
185. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459–60 (1976).
186. See PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 168, at 8.
187. See id. at 9. The silver platter doctrine is the concept that evidence seized by state or local
law enforcement officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment can still be used in federal
proceedings. See Janis, 428 U.S. at 444. This doctrine has since been held not to apply in federal
criminal proceedings. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
188. See PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 168, at 9.
189. See  INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1984).
190. See PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 168, at 9.
191. See id.
192. Id.
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ernment has the sole power to impose immigration penalties.193 There-
fore, the only proceeding in which the evidence can be used is the
federal proceeding.194 Thus, to deter the local law enforcement officer,
the evidence collected must be suppressed in the federal proceeding.
Second, while state and local officers are rarely interested in tax
proceedings, many state and local law enforcement officers “have taken
a strong interest in assisting the federal government with immigration
enforcement.”195 Because of the interest in enforcing immigration law,
state and local officers are “likely to be motivated to obtain evidence
that could be used in an immigration removal proceeding.”196 As such,
suppressing illegally obtained evidence in immigration proceedings will
likely have a significant deterrent effect for state and local law enforce-
ment officers.197
Third, in the tax context, the suppression of illegally seized evi-
dence in a federal criminal trial would be a sufficient deterrent for state
or local officers.198 As such, “[t]here would be limited additional deter-
rent benefit from suppressing evidence in federal civil proceedings.”199
This reasoning does not apply to the immigration context, however,
because the illegally seized evidence is more often than not used in a
civil deportation hearing rather than a federal criminal proceeding.200
State officers understand that any evidence they obtain is more likely to
be used in civil rather than criminal proceedings.201 Therefore, to be an
effective deterrent, the evidence must be suppressed in the civil proceed-
ing.202 Relying on suppression in any related criminal proceeding is not
effective.203
V. WHY THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS SHOULD NOT BE USED TO
DETERMINE WHETHER THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD
APPLY TO IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
The cost-benefit analysis performed by the Supreme Court in
Lopez-Mendoza would have a much different outcome if performed












204. See supra Part III.
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an effective form of evaluation for this issue, it no longer is.205 Addition-
ally, the Court’s analysis in Lopez-Mendoza should have remained as
persuasive as when the case was decided if the exclusionary rule was
still not appropriate in removal proceedings. However, it has not.206
Therefore, a cost-benefit analysis should no longer be used to determine
the application of the exclusionary rule for two reasons. First, it should
not be used because of the inherent problems with balancing tests.207
Second, it should not be used because relying almost exclusively on the
deterrent effect to analyze the benefits of the exclusionary rule misun-
derstands the foundations of the rule itself.208
A. The Inherent Issues with Balancing Tests
Balancing tests are a relatively new form of analysis used by the
courts; there is no real historical foundation for such methods in the
courts’ early rulings.209 Balancing tests were first incorporated into the
courts’ jurisprudence in 1939.210 The balancing test was essentially a
“judicial creation” as the “Constitution does not state balancing tests
should be used to interpret it.”211
As Justice Brennan aptly stated in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,212 the
problem with balancing tests is that they are “not a neutral, utilitarian
calculus but an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will.”213 This is because
the imprecise nature of legal balancing allows judges to insert their per-
205. This conclusion is in line with the general decline and criticism of the balancing test
announced in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see infra Part V.A.
206. See supra Part III.
207. See generally Christopher J. Schmidt, Ending the Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test:
Time for a New Due Process Test, 38 SW. L. REV. 287, 288–94 (2008) (discussing the lack of
historical foundation for and practical problems with balancing tests); Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976) (discussing why the
Mathews approach is subjective and impressionistic).
208. See generally Sundby, supra note 164 (explaining that “when rule-of-law principles are
used as the prism through which the exclusionary rule is viewed, the exclusionary rule’s
fundamental value to our criminal justice system becomes far more compelling,” and that these
rule-of-law principles provide reasons for everyone (even its critics) to embrace the exclusionary
rule).
209. See Schmidt, supra note 207, at 289.
210. See Frank N. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 16, 18 (1988) (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161–65 (1939)) (determining the
genesis of balancing tests to be 1939).
211. See Schmidt, supra note 207, at 289; see also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36,
61–68 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing why the application of the First Amendment
should not be subject to a balancing test); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 138–39,
143–44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (accord).
212. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
213. Id. at 369 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sonal views into the balancing tests.214 In addition, legal interests do not
have real, measurable weight in the way that physical objects placed on
a scale do, making it difficult for the interests on either side of the scale
to be compared to each other.215 A legal balancing scale is thus an inef-
fective tool because it cannot physically tilt one way or the other to
determine which weight is greater.216 Without this physical tilting, there
is no way to completely eliminate human error.217 Furthermore, “since
balancing tests are not true mathematical or economic equations, there is
no way to check or prove a court’s answer as one can do in true mathe-
matical problems and solutions.”218 Additionally, there are often merits
to both sides, making it even more complicated to weigh them against
each other.219 These issues often force the court to “‘measure the
unmeasurable [and] compare the incomparable.’”220
In addition to the physical limitations of legal balancing scales, “the
utilitarian calculus tends, as cost-benefit analyses typically do, to ‘dwarf
soft variables’ and to ignore complexities and ambiguities.”221 In using a
utilitarian calculus, “the Court may define the relevant costs and benefits
too narrowly.”222 Even if the costs and benefits are sufficiently broad,
the calculus asks “unanswerable questions,” such as what is the social
value and the social cost of applying the exclusionary rule in deportation
proceedings.223 This is an unanswerable question because there is no
technique to measure the associated costs and benefits with one hundred
percent accuracy. Lastly, the utilitarian calculus may not allow for the
constitutionally relevant questions to be answered.224 The protections of
the Fourth Amendment have been interpreted to involve individual
rights, so weighing the social values and costs collectively cannot deter-
mine whether these rights will effectively be protected.225
Another issue that arises specifically when dealing with an individ-
214. See Schmidt, supra note 207, at 291–92. See also Bernard Schwartz, Cost-Benefit
Analysis in Administrative Law: Does it Make Priceless Procedural Rights Worthless?, 37 AD. L.
REV. 13–14 (1985) (“Just as each utilitarian would apply the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest
number’ principle according to his own subjective judgment of the pains and pleasures involved,
so each judge employing [cost benefit analysis] will use his own individual calculus in weighing
the procedural rights at issue.” (internal citation omitted)).
215. See Schmidt, supra note 207, at 290.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.; see also Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 825, 842 (1994).
219. See Schmidt, supra note 207, at 290.
220. Id. at 291.




225. See id. at 49; see also Schwartz, supra note 214, at 14.
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ual right like the one protected by the exclusionary rule is that the costs
are much easier to quantify than the benefits.226 In fact, it is virtually
impossible to measure most procedural rights in monetary terms, but it
is not nearly as difficult to measure the costs of protecting those
rights.227 As such, the cost-benefit analysis will always tend to weigh in
favor of the cost side of the scale.228 The result is that the law is “drawn
into a curious world where the ‘costs’ of excluding illegally obtained
evidence loom to exaggerated heights and where the ‘benefits’ of such
exclusion are made to disappear with a mere wave of the hand.”229
For these reasons, the same balancing test used in Lopez-Mendoza
would produce a much different result today.230 This inconsistency dem-
onstrates the problems with a cost-benefit analysis. It is one reason why
the balancing test should no longer be used to determine the application
of the exclusionary rule to immigration proceedings.
B. The Abandonment of the Original Purpose of the
Exclusionary Rule
Aside from the issues with balancing tests in general, using a bal-
ancing test to assess the applicability of the exclusionary rule to immi-
gration proceedings misinterprets the original purpose of the
exclusionary rule. Cost-benefit analysis was not originally a part of the
exclusionary rule calculus.231 It only became a part of the equation when
the courts applied the exclusionary rule outside of its traditional criminal
setting.232 The exclusionary rule was initially created to promote rule-of-
law principles, such as judicial integrity and the protection of the rights
of the ordinary citizen.233 The exclusionary rule promotes judicial integ-
rity by providing the judiciary with a tool to carry out its constitutional
226. See Schwartz, supra note 214, at 14.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
Schwartz, supra note 214, at 14.
230. See supra Part III.
231. See Sundby, supra note 164, at 396.
232. See id. Cost-benefit analysis did not surface in exclusionary rule cases until the 1960s,
nearly seventy-five years after the exclusionary rule first appeared. Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886), is generally cited as the first exclusionary rule case, while the deterrence
rationale did not surface until Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See id. at 395 n.9, 396 n.13;
see also Scott E. Sundby & Lucy B. Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two Creation
Stories of the Exclusionary Rule, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 391, 433 (2010).
233. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914); see also Nigro, supra note 16, at
567; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Sundby states that “the rule of law at its most basic embodies
the idea that no one is above the law, even those in positions of government authority, and that the
legitimacy of our system of laws depends on the ability of ordinary citizens to invoke the law on
their behalf in everyday courts.” Sundby, supra note 164, at 399.
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duties.234 These duties include keeping “the other branches within their
proper constitutional bounds” and preventing government misbehavior
from gaining “even the slightest foothold.”235 By giving the Fourth
Amendment meaning to everyone236 and allowing ordinary people to
bring law enforcement practices out from the shadows,237 the exclusion-
ary rule also protects the ordinary citizen. As originally conceived, the
exclusionary rule is more like the “constitutional enforcement rule,”
holding government actors accountable to the Constitution to protect its
underlying long-term values.238 The exclusionary rule in this form is
also a recognition of the fact that the long-term interests that it protects
are more important than the short-term effects of letting a criminal go
free.239 In other words, “the concern over how the government obeys the
law means that we are willing to risk letting someone who commits a
crime walk free lest a broader commitment to the rule of law be jeopard-
ized.”240 Viewed in this way, the value of the exclusionary rule is not as
a protection to an individual defendant but instead as a safeguard to
society as a whole.
Despite these origins, by the 1980s, the deterrence rationale became
the main justification for the exclusionary rule, eliminating the other
bases.241 When deterrence became the main focus, many felt that the
exclusionary rule turned into a “necessary evil” as opposed to a positive
force that was meant to uphold American legal values, such as judicial
integrity and protection of the ordinary citizen.242 One of the issues with
the “deterrence focus” is that it focuses on the exclusionary rule as
applied to a specific case whereas rule-of-law principles, such as judicial
integrity and protection of the ordinary citizen, focus on the larger val-
ues at stake.243 In other words, the rule-of-law approach looks at the
234. See Sundby, supra note 164, at 403. For a thorough discussion of the judicial integrity
rationale for the exclusionary rule, see generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Hypocrisy, Corruption, and
Illegitimacy: Why Judicial Integrity Justifies the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 419
(2013).
235. See Sundby, supra note 164, at 403–04.
236. See id. at 407.
237. See id. at 410.
238. See id. at 399–400.
239. See id. at 400–01.
240. See id. at 400 (internal quotations omitted).
241. See id. at 396; see also Nigro, supra note 16, at 568 (“The Supreme Court introduced the
deterrence rationale in Wolf v. Colorado, which extended the application of the Fourth
Amendment to the states.”). See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (using a
deterrence-focused cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply
to grand jury proceedings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (using a deterrence-focused
cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply to habeas corpus).
242. See Sundby, supra note 164, at 397.
243. See id. at 402–11. See also Taslitz, supra note 234, at 456 (“The rule of law includes,
among other things, these concepts: (1) having a government that limits its own power by abiding
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exclusionary rule from the perspective of the citizen and her rights and
not just the police officer and the drug dealer.244
The Court did not discuss the exclusionary rule in the immigration
context until 1984 when the Court had already shifted its focus to deter-
rence.245 As such, the Court in Lopez-Mendoza relied heavily on the
deterrence rationale and used a cost-benefit analysis to determine
whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to immigration proceed-
ings.246 This is why the exclusionary rule has run into such resistance in
the immigration context—because the Court did not keep in mind the
legal principles that the exclusionary rule was originally meant to pro-
tect, rule-of-law principles like judicial integrity, protection of the ordi-
nary citizen, and belief in the larger legitimacy of adjudication.247 In his
Lopez-Mendoza dissent, Justice Marshall stated:
[A] sufficient reason for excluding from civil deportation proceedings
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is that there
is no other way to achieve “the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to
avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring
the people—all potential victims of unlawful government conduct—
that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus
minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government.”248
The Court’s focus on applying the exclusionary rule as “an indirect
effort to punish” immigration officials led it to believe that the costs of
the exclusionary rule were too high and that there were other forces in
place to provide deterrence.249 If “properly understood as a manifesta-
tion of our system’s rule-of-law principles,” then the necessity of apply-
ing the exclusionary rule to immigration proceedings becomes much
clearer as “an expression of bedrock constitutional values.”250
Immigration judges could promote judicial integrity by applying
the exclusionary rule in removal proceedings, thus preventing ICE
officers and local law enforcement officers from being above the law, as
they often are now.251 By enforcing the Fourth Amendment rights of
by standing laws; (2) fostering equality before the law, meaning at a minimum that government
officials and other powerful persons are treated the same by the law as are ordinary folk; and (3)
achieving enforced human rights.”).
244. See Sundby, supra note 164, at 399.
245. See id. at 396.
246. See supra Part II.B.
247. See Sundby, supra note 164, at 402–11.
248. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1060–61 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974)).
249. See Sundby, supra note 164, at 416.
250. Id. at 417.
251. See supra Part III.A.
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society’s most legally vulnerable, immigration courts would also be pro-
tecting the Fourth Amendment rights of all individuals.252 As Justice
Traynor stated in People v. Cahan, “how short the step is from lawless
although efficient enforcement of the law to the stamping out of human
rights.”253 When viewing the exclusionary rule in this way, it becomes
clear that the rule should apply in removal proceedings to uphold these
rule-of-law principles. While the Court has distanced itself from the
rule-of-law rationale, “the exclusionary rule is not, and was never
intended to be, a matter of ‘deterrence.’”254 To rest the whole reason for
not applying the exclusionary rule to immigration proceedings on deter-
rence is to not understand the exclusionary rule in the first place. For
these reasons, the exclusionary rule should apply to immigration
proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The reasons to apply the exclusionary rule in the immigration con-
text are two-fold. First, the Court’s decades-old analysis in Lopez-Men-
doza would produce the opposite result today. Because of the
criminalization of immigration law, respondents in immigration pro-
ceedings face the same potential issues and penalties as defendants in
criminal proceedings. As such, the exclusionary rule should be applied
uniformly in both the criminal and immigration context. Second, the
rule-of-law principles from which the exclusionary rule originated dic-
tate its application. There has been scholarship in the criminal law com-
munity suggesting that we return the exclusionary rule to its rule-of-law
origins based on the demand for judicial integrity and the need to protect
the rights of all citizens.255 Doing the same in immigration proceedings
would eliminate the need for the cost-benefit analysis used in Lopez-
Mendoza. Appreciating and employing rule-of-law principles, the exclu-
sionary rule should apply to immigration proceedings in full force.
252. See Elias, supra note 2, at 1151.
253. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 447 (1955).
254. See Milton Hirsch, Big Bill Haywood’s Revenge: The Original Intent of the Exclusionary
Rule, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 35, 85 (2009).
255. See, e.g., id. at 86; Sundby, supra note 164, at 414–17.
